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Abstract: This paper discusses the impact of Sraffa’s thinking on economics.  It argues increasing 
specialization in research is producing an ‘all trees, no forest’ fragmentation of economics that 
creates opportunities for a return to concerns that motivated classical political economy.  It 
associates this with a methodological conception of what a more pluralistic economics involves, 
and applies this to relationships between production and distribution.  A methodological 
conception of ‘openness’ is traced to a 1931 turning point in Sraffa’s thinking when he used an 
open-closed distinction to explain the relationship between production and distribution, and 
engaged in a philosophy of science reasoning reminiscent of systems theory.  The paper argues 
there are important parallels between Sraffa and Gramsci’s thinking regarding the open-closed 
distinction. 
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1 Introduction: The impact of Sraffa’s thinking 
Piero Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities (1960) was path-breaking as 
a contribution to political economy and penetrating as a critique of the orthodox economics of the 
twentieth century.  As Ajit Sinha recently put it, the book produced a ‘revolution in economic 
theory’ (Sinha, 2016; cf. Martins, 2019), the impact and significance of which continues to be 
investigated.  At the same time, despite the depth and far-reaching implications of Sraffa’s critique 
of orthodox economics it was ignored by the great majority of economists, and this not only 
complicates our understanding of its impact on economic theory, but also creates a paradox 
regarding our interpretation of ‘the’ history of economics.  For Sraffa, ‘the’ history of economics 
dates back at least to Adam Smith and David Ricardo as founders of a subject specifically 
understood as political economy.  Yet economics today is no longer identified as political economy 
by most people in the field, is conventionally said to be a science independent of history, politics, 
 
1 I am grateful for comments on an earlier version of this chapter from Cristina Marcuzzo, Geoffrey Harcourt, Nuno 
Martins, and Ajit Sinha.  All errors remain mine alone. 
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and social values, and thus makes little reference to how the social organization of the economy 
was a distinctive characteristic of the thinking of Smith, Ricardo, Marx, and others in the history 
of political economy.   
We might explain this paradox, and Sraffa’s contemporary influence, as an instance of ‘scientific 
amnesia’ – a phenomenon whereby the leading edge of a science is so focused on particular 
problems at hand that the past commitments and achievements of the field are neglected and 
forgotten.  One can argue that all sciences, as their subjects of investigation are further and further 
extended, undertake increasingly specialized types of research, and that this produces a 
fragmentation in science whereby researchers no longer assess a science’s overall goals and its 
history of development and only focus on very narrow issues.  I have recently argued that this sort 
of development characterizes contemporary economics – an ‘all trees, no forest’ type scenario 
(Davis, 2019).  One possible consequence, then, of this sort of development might be a rise in 
pluralism in science.  Pluralism of course has different meanings.  In is more normative sense, it 
involves a culture in a science that embraces and promotes diverse research strategies.  In its more 
descriptive sense, it involves how the practice and social organization of a science happens to 
foster diverse research strategies – irrespective of the attitudes of researchers toward diversity in 
research.  It is this latter state of affairs, I believe, that seems to characterize current economics, 
especially since there is little evidence of a culture of pluralism in today’s economics.  The advance 
of specialization in economics, made possible by the modern growth of the field in the resources 
it commands and the number of researchers it involves, has generated a diversity in new research 
strategies that exceeds what was the case only quite recently up to the end of the first half of the 
twentieth century and arguably into the first postwar decades of the second half of the twentieth 
century. 
This, then, tells us something about interpreting the impact and significance of Sraffa’s thinking.  
The publication of the Production of Commodities and the debates immediately thereafter over its 
meaning and implications occurred at the end of a long period in the history of economics prior to 
the recent emergence of a de facto greater diversity of research strategies in the field.  During this 
period neoclassical economics possessed a dominant presence in the field, and diversity in research 
was relatively modest if not actively discouraged.  However, as Beatrice Cherrier has shown in her 
study of the evolution of the JEL (Journal of Economic Literature) code used to classify different 
economic approaches and areas of investigation in economics, over the last half century – that is, 
since the publication of Sraffa’s book – there has been a significant increase in new categories and 
new sub-categories of research in economics associated with new fields of research, new 
techniques and methods of research, and new domains of application (Cherrier, 2017).   
This suggests, then, that our evaluation of the impact of Sraffa’s book up to now may have been, 
in effect, backward-looking in that views of its reception have been framed by the history of 
economics of the first half of the twentieth century, a period when neoclassical economics was 
commonly identified with the field.  If we instead adopt a forward-looking perspective, and frame 
the book’s impact in terms of how economics has developed since 1960, we arguably get a 
different view.  The earlier frame is one in which orthodox economics had largely replaced the 
political economy arguments of Smith, Ricardo, and Sraffa.  In contrast, the later frame is one in 
which political economy arguments have re-emerged in a range of new research venues, especially, 
for example, in the re-invigorated recent debate over economic inequality (Chetty et al., 2018; 
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Chetty et al., 2017; Milanovic, 2016; Piketty and Saez, 2003; Saez and Zucman, 2014), which 
again makes relationships between classes and social groups central to economics in the manner 
of classical political economy.  Indeed, the whole issue of globalization, much discussed today, 
raises fundamental questions about how economies are organized and grow, essentially just what 
concerned Smith, Ricardo, and Marx as political economists.  From this perspective, Sraffa’s 
contributions could well have an increasing impact and significance in the future – for reasons I 
will discuss in this paper.    
However, left unaddressed in this picture, and potentially counteracting it, is the intellectual inertia 
of the past, and the role that economists’ past attitudes and beliefs about the nature of economics 
might play in economics’ future evolution.  Needless to say, it is difficult to summarize the 
attitudes and beliefs of a large number of individuals, so claims about what economists’ attitudes 
and beliefs are should be treated with caution.  At the same time, one ought not deny that there 
exist collective views about economics and what it investigates on the part of great numbers of 
economists.  If we term these views an ideology of economics, they represent assumptions that are 
likely slow to change but which might nonetheless also evolve over time as research strategies in 
economics diversify and what economists investigate changes.  My conjecture, then, is that the 
emergence of a de facto greater diversity of research strategies in the field associated with 
increasing specialization in research is likely to act contrary to the field’s past dominant conception 
of economics, if with a lag, and lead us increasingly back to a political economic thinking in the 
tradition of Smith, Ricardo, Marx, and Sraffa.  In short, as the world has become economically 
more complicated in the future, and as economics research becomes increasingly diversified, a 
natural ideological posture for economists is to adopt is to be ‘open’ to thinking that confronts the 
changing ways in which the economies of the world are organized and function.  
If this is so, it is worth examining what an increasingly ‘open’ ideological conception of economics 
might involve.  This chapter seeks to develop a conception of what this might involve by following 
Sraffa’s early lead in formulating a distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed.’  Sraffa’s Production 
of Commodities is not generally associated with this issue, and much of the research it generated 
is concerned with complex technical issues surrounding the nature of commodity values and 
production.  Yet Sraffa’s views regarding the relationship between production and distribution – 
views that departed in fundamental ways from neoclassical economics – raise important issues 
regarding how the economy may be open to history and change, and thus provide grounds for 
saying what an ‘open’ ideological conception of economics might involve.   
This chapter traces Sraffa’s views on this back to an early turning point in his intellectual 
development en route to the Production of Commodities that he commented upon in his 
unpublished 1931 ‘Surplus Product’ manuscript (Sraffa, 1931).  I revisit this document and argue 
that it involves an important contribution to the philosophy of science of economics in regard to 
how understanding the relationship between economics and the economy depends on working with 
a methodological conception of openness.  While there is a great deal of careful scholarship on the 
Production of Commodities, less extensively investigated is Sraffa’s philosophy of science 
thinking, and the role it plays in his economic thinking.  This chapter is intended as a contribution 
to this side of his thought.   
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To introduce this discussion, Section 2 reviews Sraffa’s economic contribution and critique of 
orthodox neoclassical economics, especially as they concern the relationship between production 
and distribution.  It then places the Production of Commodities in its historical context, and 
discusses the puzzling nature of its reception in economics, treating this as methodological 
problem concerning how sciences evaluate and respond to internal critique.   
 
Section 3 discusses Sraffa’s 1931 manuscript.  Here, building on arguments I previously developed 
(Davis, 2012, 2018), I argue that Sraffa used an open-closed distinction to explain the relationship 
between production and distribution, and engaged in a kind of philosophy of science reasoning 
that has come to be associated with systems theory.  
 
Section 4 connects Sraffa’s philosophy of science, methodological reasoning to his Turin, Italy 
origins and connection to Antonio Gramsci.  It argues that Gramsci in his development of the 
concept of hegemony was concerned with how capitalism organized different domains of social 
activity, and then argues that there are important parallels between this and Sraffa’s thinking 
regarding the open-closed distinction. 
 
Section 5 closes the chapter by briefly commenting upon openness as a principle of explanation, 
and returning to the issue of economics’ ideological conception of the relationship between 
economics and the economy.  If how the world’s economies are changing promotes a de facto 
greater diversity in economic thinking resonant of the political economic views of Smith, Ricardo, 
and Marx, then Sraffa’s thinking, with its focus on the relation between distribution and 
production, may enjoy new appreciation.   
 
2  Sraffa’s entry point and challenge to neoclassical economics 
To begin, let me summarize the domain of research stimulated by Sraffa’s important book.  I rely 
on Tony Aspromourgos’ extensive review of the scholarly literature on Sraffa’s thinking (through 
2004) that distinguishes five separate research programmes that he sees Sraffa as having been 
responsible for having generated: (a) the nature and significance of long-period equilibria in the 
theory of distribution and production prices; (b) the Cambridge Growth Equation and closures of 
the distribution system via the accumulation rate; (c) closures of the distribution system via the 
monetary determination of the rate of interest; (d) production prices, effective demand and long-
period adjustment – the Sraffa–Keynes synthesis; (e) the critique of marginalism (Aspromourgos, 
2004, Table 1).  As Aspromourgos shows, research on Sraffa’s economic thinking is quite 
advanced and far-reaching.  But what is it that unites all these different research programmes?   
I take as an entry point, as many others have also argued, Sraffa’s profound investigation of the 
relationship between production and distribution, and how it contrasts in fundamental ways with 
marginalist neoclassical economics.  In the latter, individual economic agents’ optimization 
behavior generates demand and supply functions for all goods and factors of production under 
market-clearing competitive conditions, such that production and distribution are simultaneously 
determined – a framework fully explainable in terms of a self-contained economic logic of scarcity.  
In contrast, Sraffa rejected the factor substitution production analysis this involved, and developed 
an analysis of commodity prices in production systems in which, given the methods of production 
and the level of output produced, one distributive variable is fixed exogenously (for example, the 
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general rate of profit), or is set outside of the analysis, thereby determining all other distributive 
variables (in particular, the wage rate).  This effectively ‘opens’ the ‘closed’ neoclassical system 
of production and distribution in which all economic relationships are endogenous to one another 
and in which individual economic agents determine prices independently of any historical 
reference or context. For Sraffa, whatever the rate of profit is, or alternatively whatever the wage 
rate is, is determined by historical conditions, not by a self-contained economic logic independent 
of history, so that economic analysis always needs to be integrated with an analysis of the social 
forces determining those rates. 
Sraffa’s rejection of marginalist thinking – the foundation of the neoclassical analysis of prices – 
has made his own analysis of commodity prices a central focus of Sraffa scholarship.  That 
explanation depends on input-output ratios and production coefficients tied to methods of 
production and technologies in use when there are many capital goods, or capital is heterogeneous.  
Neoclassical economists, following in the lead of J.B. Clark (1891), had come to rely on the idea 
that capital goods could be represented as a single quantity of capital and the economy as a whole 
could be represented as a single aggregate production function.  This led them to claim that scarcity 
relationships governed the economy, and in the case of capital that there accordingly exists an 
inverse monotonic relation between the quantity of capital and the rate of interest.  Sraffa’s analysis 
showing that such phenomena as capital-reversing would occur when a lower capital/labor ratio is 
associated with a lower interest rate was contrary to neoclassical scarcity reasoning and the idea 
that a demand for capital curve must always be downward sloping.   
This result led to a lengthy, complex debate – the so-called ‘capital theory controversy’ (cf. Cohen 
and Harcourt, 2003) – in which leading neoclassical economists from Cambridge in the US 
attempted to defend the Clark vision and set aside Sraffa’s thinking, while leading economists 
from Cambridge in the UK and Italy defended Sraffa’s conclusions.  The result of this debate was 
that the neoclassical substitution analysis was shown to fail as an interpretation of the economy as 
a whole, and that Sraffa’s explanation of commodity prices was agreed to provide a more accurate 
and more sophisticated account of the nature of production.  Yet, as is well known, most 
neoclassical economists subsequently ignored this outcome and proceeded as if the ‘capital theory 
controversy’ debate had never occurred.   
 
This is puzzling from a history of science perspective since a widely shared belief is that scientific 
progress prevails in the long run, meaning that discredited theories and unsupportable explanations 
are ultimately abandoned.  It might be thought that when the issues debated are highly complex, 
as they were in this case, that this outcome can be delayed, on the grounds that it would then take 
considerable time for important scientific results to be acknowledged and understood.  Yet this 
should not have been the case in regard to the ‘capital theory controversy’ since the most influential 
neoclassical economist of the time, Paul Samuelson, who was centrally involved in the debate, 
explicitly and clearly stated at  its end that the neoclassical aggregate production function analysis 
could not be maintained (Samuelson, 1966).  This seems to imply, then, that the conventional view 
of science – that progress ultimately prevails – is somehow incorrect.  This is both worrisome and 
confusing.  It is worrisome because it suggests humanity’s best efforts to understand the world 
may sometimes be fruitless; it is confusing because it challenges our whole conception of science 
as rational dialogue. 
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I believe, however, that we can retain the general view that science is a progressive human 
endeavor if we modify the view that science is essentially a rational dialogue.  Let me explain this 
in connection with the evolution of philosophy of science thinking in the postwar period.  Though 
that thinking is largely the product of reflection on the history and character of natural and physical 
science, where historians of science generally believe there is strong support for a progress view, 
the argument has also been made that progress operates in the social and human sciences as well.  
Influential in this regard is Karl Popper’s defense of falsificationist inquiry and rationality 
throughout science (Popper, 1963).  In his view, though practitioners invested in past research are 
often guilty of ‘immunizing’ it from confounding evidence and competing theories, in the long run 
these efforts are likely to succumb to rational inquiry.   
 
Popper’s arguments, however, encountered a problem in the form of the Duhem-Quine thesis, 
which was that any particular scientific proposition subject to testing and apparent falsification, 
which was an implication of a theory with its many supporting assumptions and confirming 
evidence, could still be retained if that theory and the assumptions from which it is derived are 
sufficiently modified and reconfigured (cf. Boumans and Davis, 2016, pp. 90-2).  In effect, 
questionable propositions in theories that fail to be empirically supported can be insulated from 
critical evaluation by creative re-elaboration of the theories in which they are embedded.  Imre 
Lakatos, in his methodology of scientific research programmes approach, accordingly revised 
Popper’s views to account for this, arguing that scientific theories typically possessed ‘hard cores’ 
of basic principles which scientists often aimed to preserve under all circumstances (Lakatos, 
1978).  But Lakatos did not explain what motivated scientists’ defenses of theories’ ‘hard cores.’       
 
Consider, then, what happened in the case of the ‘capital controversy’ critique of neoclassical 
substitution analysis.  While it was agreed that the aggregate production function view had been 
falsified as Popper would have emphasized, nonetheless, in Duhem-Quine terms, neoclassical 
theory after the debate largely came to be seen as represented by the Walrasian multi-market 
general equilibrium framework to which it was argued this critique did not apply (Hahn, 1982).  
In a general equilibrium framework there are many capital goods, not a single aggregate capital.  
At the same time, the static character of the Walrasian framework meant that such problems as 
capital-reversing (which depend on temporal analysis) do not arise, so the critique of scarcity 
reasoning lost its immediate target.  What, then, was the ‘hard core’ of neoclassical theory, as 
Lakatos would have put it, and what, moreover, motivated its defense?         
 
There are different possible answers to these questions, but I emphasize one specific to Sraffa’s 
political economic concern with history and the relationship between production and distribution.  
As we saw, central to this is his rejection of the marginalist idea that all economic activities are 
endogenous to one another – that is, that economic analysis is closed, and involves a fully self-
contained scarcity logic sufficient for explaining any historical context.  Whether economics 
should be thought to be closed in this way or should be thought to be historically open as Sraffa 
believed, then, concerns a fundamental matter, namely how one understands the relationship 
between economics and the economy.  Neither view, it seems fair to say, can ultimately be 
empirically verified or falsified.  Indeed, what evidence would ever clearly tell us which view 
should be favored?  In addition, proponents of each view, committed to their respective beliefs, 
are likely to always be able to reframe their theories in a Duhem-Quine manner to accommodate 
or set aside evidence inconsistent with them.  Thus, I characterize both views, following Lakatos, 
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as ‘hard core’ beliefs, or alternatively as ideological conceptions that underlie economists’ 
philosophy of science thinking.   
 
Yet if economists’ ‘hard core’ or ideological beliefs are not subject to empirical verification or 
falsification, might something else affect them?  Looking at the change in economics especially in 
the more recent postwar period, I argued above that economics is becoming more diverse as a 
consequence of the growth in numbers of economists and the field’s increasing rate of 
specialization, and that this is occurring in a globalizing world seen as exhibiting greater 
inequality.  I suggested that this change may produce a more political economic type thinking in 
economics, especially compared with economics’ recent past, as the range of types of issues 
investigated expands together with a rising awareness of the social dimensions of economies in 
the world today.  That is, economics may be becoming de facto more pluralistic despite the 
discipline’s past orientation.  If this is indeed the case, then, economists’ ‘hard core’ views and 
ideological conceptions as pertain to the relationship between economics and the economy may 
change as well.  What this change could then promote would be a more open view of economics 
emphasizing how the relationship between production and distribution varies over time and across 
societies, rather than the more ‘closed’ understanding of that relationship which makes them 
endogenous to one another in a way that fits all societies in an ahistorical and identical way. 
 
To explore further what an open ideological conception of economics might involve, the next 
section, discusses Sraffa’s distinction between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ in his 1931 ‘Surplus Product’ 
manuscript.  Sraffa sought to restore political economic thinking in economics.  As we will see, 
not only did he intend to develop a powerful economic analysis of commodity values alternative 
to that given by marginalism, but also sought to build that analysis upon secure philosophy of 
science foundations.  Those foundations, I will argue, depend on his open-closed distinction. 
 
3 Sraffa’s 1931 Manuscript and the open-closed distinction 
In his 1931 “Surplus Product” manuscript, Sraffa distinguished clearly between what he called the 
‘economic field’ – later the subject of his Production of Commodities analysis of commodity 
values – and distribution particularly as pertained to the surplus product, thus suggesting that they 
constituted two different types of economic systems.  But why should we say these two domains 
constitute different ‘systems’ rather than, say, just different aspects of the economy, as in 
marginalist neoclassical economics where everything is endogenous within one system?  The 
answer for Sraffa, I believe, derived in important ways from his philosophy of science thinking 
about the scientific principle of causality, and how maintaining this principle created a problem 
for explaining surplus product.    
For Sraffa, then, causality operated in a clear way in the ‘economic field’ following established 
thinking in natural science.  At the same time, he saw that how causality operated in the ‘economic 
field’ could not be readily transferred to an explanation of distribution and the surplus product.  
Indeed, as he expressed it: 
If one attempts to take an entirely objectivist point of view, the very conception of a surplus 
melts away. For if we take this natural science point of view, we must start by assuming 
that for every effect there must be a sufficient cause, that the causes are identical with their 
 8 
effects, and that there can be nothing in the effect which was not in the causes; in our case, 
there can be no product for which there has not been an equivalent cost, and all costs 
(=expenses) must be necessary to produce it (Sraffa, D3/12/7: 161:3). 
The “objectivist point of view” he refers to contrasts with neoclassicism’s subjectivist point of 
view, and holds that how the natural world works is independent of human valuation.  For Sraffa, 
it is embodied in “the natural science” principle that “for every effect there must be a sufficient 
cause,” a corollary of which is that “there can be nothing in the effect which was not in the causes.”  
For economics to be scientific, then, this principle needs to be applied to the analysis of production 
in terms of the idea that the costs incurred in producing goods constitute their causes, where these 
costs or “expenses” were only the commodities consumed in the production of commodities.   
Thus, clearly, Sraffa aimed to build his analysis on sound philosophy of science thinking.  Yet 
paradoxically this ‘natural science point of view’ led him to conclude that “the very conception of 
a surplus melts away” since a surplus product amounts to an excess of value over costs or 
“expenses” incurred in producing goods, thus violating the corollary that “there can be nothing in 
the effect which was not in the causes.”  Indeed, Sraffa believed that the existence of the surplus 
in capitalism depended on capitalists’ willingness to withdraw circulating capital from production 
in order to engage in luxury consumption.  Their motivation for doing so was clearly subjective 
and consequently at odds with a natural science point of view.  Thus when it came to the surplus 
product, as Heinz Kurz and Neri Salvadori have put it, “as soon as it is explained, [and] a cause is 
found for it ... [it] ceases to be a surplus,” given the cost of production analysis of commodity 
values Sraffa sought to develop (Kurz and Salvadori, 2008, p. 267; also cf. Sinha, 2016, pp. 82-
89).    
Sraffa, then, resolved this problem by first assuming that production and distribution involved two 
different types of causal systems, not just two different types of economic activities, which 
therefore could not be explained with identical forms of reasoning.  Production was still to be 
explained in an objectivist way with a natural science account of commodity values based on costs, 
but social forces operated in a different causal way in connection with distribution.  To reinforce 
this conception, Sraffa accordingly characterized commodity production and the ‘economic field’ 
as a ‘closed system.’  But he also asserted that this ‘closed system’ interacted with “outside causes” 
that somehow operate both upon it and within it at the same time.  As he put it, this ‘closed system’ 
somehow had a “leak” by which it communicated with the world permitting these “outside causes” 
to affect the determination of commodity values. 
There must be a leak at one end or the other: the ‘closed system’ is in communication with 
the world.  When we have defined our ‘economic field’, there are still outside causes which 
operate in it; and its effects go beyond the boundary (Sraffa, D3/12/7: 161: 5).  
One might argue that since “outside causes” also affect commodity values that it makes no sense 
to say that the ‘economic field’ should be modeled as a ‘closed system.’  However, Sraffa 
recognized that subsistence economies producing no surplus represented production in its most 
basic form, implying that later stages of historical development which produced a surplus only 
modified the operation of the ‘economic field.’  We should say, then, that the ‘economic field’s is 
merely a relatively independent ‘closed system’ in which commodity values are dominated by, but 
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not exclusively determined by, their costs of production.  This characterization is reinforced by the 
fact that different historical regimes would be expected to affect the ‘economic field’ differently, 
implying that over time the ‘economic field’ was independent of its different historical 
manifestations and only modified in its functioning by social forces. 
Thus, the position Sraffa adopted for explaining commodity values when a surplus is generated 
involves two types of causal systems whose different principles affect how production and 
distribution interact and work together. The Production of Commodities later showed how 
distributive variables mathematically enter into the determination of commodity values, but does 
not interpret this in system terms or raise philosophy of science issues regarding causality.  Perhaps 
Sraffa believed a philosophy of science treatment of the matter would have made his analysis in 
the book unnecessarily more complicated, and could have distracted from the its main conclusions 
when he wanted his analysis to be as clear and powerful as possible.  Yet the issues he addressed 
in his 1931 manuscript remain. 
On one level, then, we might explore further Sraffa’s conception of how two types of causality 
combine to produce one causal system.  However, I put aside this investigation because Sraffa’s 
thinking about science does not lead in this direction.  As Sinha notes, Sraffa “never adopted a 
deterministic scientific point of view,” but was rather “committed to the quantum physics point of 
view of indeterminacy” (Sinha, 2016, p. 88), so the whole idea that two types of causality might 
combine in some single way is foreign to his thinking.    
On a second level, however, we can say something more about how Sraffa thought in systems 
terms, since he explicitly speaks of systems in open and closed terms.  In addition, there also 
existed at the time Sraffa wrote an incipient literature on systems thinking, particularly as 
developed by Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1968).  Though there is no evidence archival or otherwise 
that I am aware of that Sraffa knew or drew on Bertalanffy’s work, at the same time, as I have 
argued (Davis, 2018), there is an important overlap in their thinking in regard to what open and 
closed systems are.  I thus draw on this overlap to say more regarding the nature of the open-closed 
distinction in Sraffa’s philosophy of science thinking. 
Bertalanffy (1901-1972) was an Austrian biologist who in the 1920s and 1930s was one of the 
early developers of general systems theory, formulated in terms of an open-closed systems 
distinction comparing how the physical sciences differ from the natural or life sciences (cf. 
Davidson, 1983).  On the one hand, he associated the former with physics and the second law of 
thermodynamics (the entropy law), and argued that the physical sciences are closed systems in the 
sense that their principles work in isolation from their particular environments.  Alternatively, 
physical science principles work in the same way in all environments no matter what the time or 
place.  On the other hand, he argued that living systems, especially those seen as undergoing 
growth and change such as studied in biology, are open in that their activity must always be 
explained in terms of their interaction with their environments, since the environments they occupy 
influence how they function.  Thus, whereas closed systems always operate in the same way, open 
systems always work differently according to the environments they occupy. 
We can recast Bertalanffy’s distinction between open and closed sciences as a distinction between 
open systems that are dependent on time and place and closed systems that are in an important 
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sense independent of time and place.  For Sraffa, then, whereas the distribution of the surplus in 
terms of wages and profits is settled in an open socio-historical way, production relationships are 
rather closed in a technically determined way.2 
In economics, this is the difference between a type of analysis that is fully self-contained and 
applies to any and all historical contexts, and a type of analysis that always needs to be integrated 
with its historical context.  For Sraffa, neoclassical economics is a closed system because all 
relationships are endogenous to one another, and the scarcity reasoning which this allows can be 
applied to any environment, circumstance, or application no matter what the time, place, or setting.  
In contrast, his political economic distinction between production and distribution as two different 
domains of economic activity essentially treated the former as a closed system (in that it still 
obeyed the principles of natural science) which was nonetheless still open to the world, because it 
was influenced by social forces that reflected historical context.    
Bertalanffy did not explain how open and closed systems communicated.  He recognized that the 
natural or life sciences drew on principles from the physical sciences, but his goal as a biologist 
was to make the case that the natural or life sciences operated on a different basis from the physical 
sciences despite their drawing on physical science.  Sraffa, however, was not in a position to avoid 
this issue of the relationship between open and closed, since economies such as capitalism function 
as wholes that are not compartmentalized in the way that the sciences are.  At the same time, the 
neoclassical way of dealing with two types of domains was not acceptable to him because the 
subjectivism on which it is based was incompatible with a natural science account of production.  
How, then, did he understand the open-closed distinction? 
What his remarks in his 1931 manuscript then specifically tell us is that the ‘economic field’ as a 
(relatively) ‘closed system’ is acted upon by “outside causes” but these “outside causes” are not 
referred to as a different type of system or appear to  constitute a system in the manner that the 
‘economic field’ does.  In contrast to Bertalanffy, who was concerned with the differences and 
relationships between two types of science systems, Sraffa was rather concerned with how a 
(relatively) ‘closed system’ might be embedded in a larger world that lacks the characteristics of a 
system.  That is, the world itself is, in effect, ‘unsystematic’ and constitutes a wider process that 
influences a (relatively) ‘closed system’ such production.  This suggests that the nature of that 
influence is not easily determined.  Were we investigating the interaction of two different kinds of 
systems, we might explain their interaction in terms of how their respective sets of principles 
combine, as did Bertalanffy when he allowed that physical science principles affect how living 
systems grow and change.  That strategy, however, was not one that Sraffa undertook.  Rather, his 
use of the open-closed distinction was not an open systems-closed systems one, but rather one that 
embedded closed systems in an open world which operated on an entirely different basis. 
If an open world is ‘unsystematic’ in the sense that it is not governed by deterministic principles 
in the way that a ‘closed system’ can be, this does not imply that it involves an entirely chaotic, 
random set of processes.  As a political economist, Sraffa thought in historical terms, where this 
meant that economies developed in an ‘arrow of history’ sort of way whereby the past influences 
the future.  Let us put this as he did in terms of  how distribution affects production.  Determining 
 
2 Thus, in regard to Sraffa’s later relationship, r = R (1 – w), the variables are determined independently of prices of 
production.  I thank Ajit Sinha for this point. 
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the profit (or wage) rate contributes to the determination of commodity values, which, given 
distributive shares, influences distribution, so how what is outside the relatively closed system of 
production not only acts upon it but also feeds back indirectly upon itself in regard to the effects 
on distribution.  Seen as a repeated, reflexive process, this can have cumulative effects on how 
economies change and develop.  Yet that distribution still belongs to an open world governed by 
social forces tells us that the specific direction that the interaction of production and distribution 
takes is not determined.  All that is determined is that the future will be different from the past – 
that is, that the economy is an open historical process. 
Sraffa, then, differed from Bertalanffy in how he used open-closed thinking.  Whereas the latter 
was motivated to explain and emphasize the distinctiveness of the natural or life sciences, Sraffa 
was motivated by the fact that economics had abandoned its identity as political economy.  He 
consequently appropriated  and reconceived the open-closed distinction as a means of developing 
the scientific foundations he thought necessary for saying that economics must be political 
economy.  Those foundations allowed him to distinguish different types of causal principles 
operating in production and distribution, and this made a philosophy of science analysis of 
causality central to the explanation of the economy as an historical process.  This also meant he 
avoided the subjectivism on which neoclassical thinking depended, and can be seen as thinking – 
as reported by Ludwig Wittgenstein – as thinking in an ‘anthropological way’ (Monk, 1990). 
From the perspective of how philosophy of science thinking evolved from Popper to Lakatos, 
Sraffa may have regarded neoclassicism’s scarcity logic as equivalent to a type of ‘hard core’ or 
ideological conception unlikely to be successfully contested in arguments about evidence.  He 
certainly saw that scarcity reasoning maintained a powerful hold on most economists’ thinking, 
and perhaps reasoned that he needed to make the case for a political economic approach on solid 
philosophy of science grounds.  That endeavor was complicated by the challenges he encountered 
in applying causal reasoning to economies that produce a surplus, but his use of the open-closed 
distinction provided a means of addressing them in a way that deepened his thinking about the role 
of history in political economy.  In the following section, I briefly compare this use of the open-
closed distinction to reasoning to how Gramsci can be interpreted as reasoning in a similar way 
about how capitalism organized different domains of social activity. 
4 Gramsci and Sraffa on the open-closed distinction  
Sraffa and Gramsci were both from Turin, Italy, and knew each other well (Naldi, 2000).  Sraffa 
came to know Gramsci in 1919, and their friendship continued until the latter’s death in 1937.  
While evidence regarding how they influenced each other’s thinking philosophically is lacking 
and much debated, how Gramsci reasoned about his central concept of hegemony can be argued 
to exhibit clear parallels to Sraffa’s open-closed distinction.  Gramsci developed the concept, then, 
to broaden the concept of state power in class society (Gramsci, 1971; cf. Bates, 1975).  
Traditionally the power of the state had only been associated with control over the machinery of 
government such as the police and the courts, but Gramsci argued that class power was also 
exercised through various non-state institutions such as the Church and the press.  This meant that 
power manifested itself in various ways in that it took on different forms in connection with how 
it was exercised in these relatively independent social domains and institutions.   
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We can characterize these relatively independent social domains and institutions such as the 
Church and the press as closed systems since they can be distinguished from one another according 
to their own sets of rules and principles.  Or rather, we should characterize them as relatively closed 
systems, in the sense employed by Sraffa, since for Gramsci how they operate is influenced by 
power relationships that lie outside of them acting upon them and affecting their internal 
functioning.  At the same time, since Gramsci believed that class power pervades society, it lacks 
the characteristics of a system itself in the way that institutions function as systems.  Moreover for 
Gramsci, class power was the product of class conflict that involved an historical process that was 
open-ended in nature. Thus interpreted, Gramsci’s thinking about hegemonic power made similar 
use of the open-closed distinction to the way that Sraffa employed it.  For both, the world is an 
open historical process in which social forces get differentially embedded in relatively closed 
systems of activity. 
Gramsci did not frame his thinking in a philosophy of science manner in terms of different kinds 
of causality and how they might interact, as I have argued Sraffa did.  But similar to Sraffa, he did 
adopt ideas suggesting he believed broad, historical social forces interacted with the functioning 
of multiple different social domains and institutions in a two-way street manner or as a repeated, 
reflexive process.  Sraffa focused on the interaction between social forces and only one relatively 
closed system, production, given his primary concern was the economy.  This allowed him to 
emphasize the primacy of the relationship between production and distribution, but he avoided 
making any claims about what sort of balance existed between them, or in Marshallian terms, 
whether this interaction produced some sort of equilibrium state of affairs. 
Gramsci, however, with his focus on power, did label that balance using the concept of 
equilibrium, though in a critical way.  In commenting on Louis Bonaparte’s conventional exercise 
of power by means of the military in nineteenth century France – Caesarism – he asserted that in 
this we saw a circumstance in which “the existing social form had not yet exhausted its possibilities 
for development,” whereas “[i]n the modern world, the equilibrium with catastrophic prospects 
occurs ... between forces whose opposition is historically incurable” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 222). 
Gramsci’s concept of a ‘catastrophic equilibrium’ is the idea of unstable equilibrium reflecting a 
combination of opposed, conflicting forces rather than the neoclassical idea of a harmony of forces.  
For Gramsci, this reflected his view that class societies were always in conflict.  We may also, 
however, explain this in terms of the open-closed distinction.  The idea of a relatively closed 
system, whether it be production or a social institution, is of something whose activities are 
primarily governed by principles specific to its nature as a particular type of system.  Yet that such 
systems are affected by forces from outside them means that their internal principles of operation 
are altered, or more strongly we might say disrupted, since as only relatively closed they are 
prevented from operating as they would in the absence of those outside forces. 
Open-closed reasoning, then, gives us a way of looking at an economic system that transforms it 
from its neoclassical, ahistorical meaning to a meaning that treats as temporary states of affairs 
appearing to be in balance yet as transient and impermanent.  This constitutes such a departure 
from its meaning in neoclassical economics that one might conclude it would be better to give up 
the concept altogether.  For Sraffa, however, the concept was part of the language of economics 
and political economy, and proceeding explicitly in this way risked making his work inaccessible.  
Gramsci’s ‘catastrophic equilibrium’ idea also employed the concept but criticized it at the same 
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time.  We cannot say whether he was influenced by his contact with Sraffa to use the idea in this 
way or that this was Sraffa’s view of the concept.  But they both appear to have used the open-
closed distinction which Sraffa developed in his 1931 deliberations over how to reason in causal 
terms about the relationship between production and distribution, and this provides grounds for 
understanding equilibrium as a transient, impermanent state of affairs.  
5 Concluding Comments: Openness as a principle of explanation 
 
This chapter’s focus was how Sraffa thought about the open-closed distinction, but its larger theme 
is the concept of openness as a principle of explanation in economic thinking.  Taking Sraffa’s 
entry point as the relationship between production and distribution, the economic approach he 
rejected – that was responsible in his view for the demise of political economy and for placing 
neoclassical economics in its place – was one that enshrined a fully closed conception of the 
economy in which all relationships are endogenous to one another.  Thus his goal was to open up 
economic analysis in order to rehabilitate political economy, which I argue required that he identify 
openness as a systematic principle of explanation.   
 
My argument in this regard is from the perspective of the present looking backward, but Sraffa’s 
pathway began almost a century ago from within the Marshallian system in his quest to make 
history matter.  He did not fully foresee how he needed to proceed, but adopted an “objectivist 
point of view” rooted in the science thinking of his time he believed offered a way forward.  To 
his surprise and dismay, he discovered, as he reported in his “Surplus Product” manuscript, that 
his goal of rehabilitating political economy was undermined by that same “objectivist point of 
view.”  This, however, impelled him to creatively re-think how causal forces could take different 
forms and interacted in ways that he then outlined in open-closed terms.   
 
Yet the destination of his work, the Production of Commodities, did not make this underlying 
thinking clear, and the Duhem-Quine general equilibrium response to the debate the book 
generated concealed its critique of the closed production-distribution neoclassical system in the 
‘hard core’ neoclassical view that scarcity logic explains all economies, whatever the time or place.  
I have treated ‘hard core’ views in economics, then, as ideological conceptions that concern the 
relationship between the field and the economic world it is intended to explain.  Sadly, evidence 
and reasoned debate seem to have little effect on what ideological conceptions people hold.  But 
if Sraffa’s political economic vision is correct, and if history does change how we see the world, 
if slowly, then the change in the world’s economies today may well make defense of the idea that 
the economy can be explained as a closed system increasingly difficult.  Then perhaps Sraffa’s 
impact on the history of economics will be seen in a brighter light and the field again identified as 
political economy as thought by Smith, Ricardo, and Marx. 
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